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Do Natural Resources Depress 





Most evidence for the resource curse comes from cross-country growth regressions suffers 
from a bias originating from the high and ever-evolving volatility in commodity prices. This 
paper addresses these issues by providing new cross-country empirical evidence for the effect 
of resources in income per capita. Natural resource dependence (resource exports) has a 
significant negative effect on income per capita, especially in countries with bad rule of law 
or bad policies, but these results weaken substantially once we allow for endogeneity. 
However, the more exogenous measure of resource abundance (stock of natural capital) has a 
significant negative effect on income per capita even after controlling for geography, rule of 
law and de facto or  de jure trade openness. Furthermore, this effect is more severe for 
countries that have little de jure trade openness. These results are robust to using alternative 
measures of institutional quality (expropriation and corruption instead of rule of law). 
JEL-Code: C21, C82, O11, O41, Q30. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Resource-rich countries such as Congo, Nigeria, Bolivia, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela often 
fall victim to a ‘resource curse’. They have fared much worse than resource-poor countries 
like the Asian Tigers. Countries with a large share of natural resource exports typically have 
a relatively low income per capita, but there are notable exceptions such as Norway or 
Botswana. Countries with large exports of natural resources have worse growth performance 
than those with little or no natural resources (Sachs and Warner, 1997), especially if they are 
point-source resources (Isham et al., 2005). This curse can be turned into a blessing in 
countries with institutions that are of sufficiently high quality (Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Boschini, et al., 2007). Using growth regressions to investigate the impact of resources on 
growth can be misleading. Depending on whether the beginning and end year period is a 
peak or trough can bias the estimate of the effect of resources on growth. If volatility changes 
over time due to say boom-bust cycles as has been the case during the last decade, this can 
further bias this estimate. Furthermore, the cited evidence typically uses the ratio of exports 
of natural resources to GDP evaluated at the beginning of the sample period to explain 
growth during the following three decades. But this is a measure of resource dependence, not 
abundance (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008)
2. Resource dependence is problematic, because 
it is associated with little economic diversification and thus high dependence is associated 
with worse economic performance. Given the inherent volatility of commodity prices, 
valuation effects can bias estimation of the effect of resources on growth depending on the 
choice of the start and end date of the sample period. We therefore depart from the literature 
by using a stock measure of resource abundance (natural capital) rather than dependence 
(resource exports) to explain cross-country differences in income rather than growth. This 
ensures that both measures are valued at the same stage of the commodity price cycle. The 
prevailing literature on the resource curse suffers from some other shortcomings as well. 
First, the implied Dutch disease story is that resource exports induce appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and decline of the traded sector. Growth falls if learning by doing externalities 
occur mainly in the traded sector. But political economy explanations of the resource curse 
(via worsening of institutions and rapacious rent seeking) may be relevant as well, since 
governments are involved in the natural resource sector through taxation, sale of licenses to 
foreign companies, state companies, thus inviting rent seeking. Others highlight that 
resources erode the critical faculties of politicians and keeps bad policies (a too generous 
welfare state, import substitution, restrictive trade policy, excessive borrowing, etc.) in place. 
The empirical resource curse literature makes no serious attempt to disentangle whether the 
adverse effect of resources on growth is due to loss of learning by doing, worsening 
institutions, or keeping bad policies in place. It is also unclear whether resources are the 
cause of bad institutions and bad policies or whether they aggravate the adverse effects of 
bad institutions and bad policies on growth. 
                                                 
2 Examples of resource-scarce but resource-dependent countries are most Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Resource-abundant and non-dependent-resource countries include Australia, Canada.    2   
 
Second, the empirical evidence for the resource curse is flawed as often no allowance is 
made for endogeneity of, say, quality of institutions or degree of trade openness.
3 In contrast, 
the literature on explaining cross-country differences in income per capita stresses the search 
for good instruments to disentangle direction of causation and correct for endogeneity. For 
example, the instruments colonial origins and settler mortality rates affect institutional 
quality but not differences in income per capital directly (Acemoglu et al., 2001). A much 
larger sample is possible if institutions are instrumented by the fraction of the population 
speaking English or Western European languages as first language (Hall and Jones, 1999). 
Gravity equations for bilateral trade flows give instruments for international trade (Frankel 
and Romer, 1999). Using this diverse set of instruments, a ‘horse race’ finds that institutions 
trump geography/climate and openness in explaining cross-country variations in income per 
capita, but geography/climate may affect income per capita indirectly through the quality of 
institutions (Rodrik et al., 2004).
4 Although some deal with endogeneity of natural resource 
export revenues (Ding and Field, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008), much of the 
empirical literature on the resource curse does not use instruments for investment, institutions 
and trade and thus ends up with biased estimates. Furthermore, apart from Mehlum et al. 
(2006) and Boschini et al. (2007), this literature does not distinguish between the effect of 
resource dependence on institutional quality and the interaction effect of resource 
dependence and institutional quality. Also, there is no attempt to identify the channel by 
which substantial natural resources might affect cross-country differences in growth. 
Third, empirical evidence for the resource curse may not be robust. Natural resource 
endowment (measured by, respectively the World Bank (2006b) data on natural wealth and 
hydrocarbon deposits) has a positive effect while resource dependence (measured by natural 
resource exports) has a negative or even no effect on growth performance (Ding and Field, 
2005; Alexeev and Conrad, 2005; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008).  
Finally, cross-country regressions suffer from omitted variable bias as they do not allow for 
correlation between initial level of productivity and past income (Islam, 2005). If this 
correlation is positive, the coefficient on lagged income is overestimated.. One way out is to 
drop lagged income per capita and focus on explaining income per capita.  
Since the estimated effects of resources on growth fail to disentangle the various 
transmission channels, often ignore endogeneity issues, suffer from omitted variable bias, 
and lead to results that are not robust, we prefer to explain cross-country variations in income 
                                                 
3 Lederman and Maloney (2006) allow for endogeneity and different time periods and cannot reproduce Sachs 
and Warner (1997). They find that resource dependence has a positive effect on growth, whereas export 
concentration hampers growth, even after controlling for physical and human capital accumulation variables.  
4 Sachs (2003) disagrees and demonstrates that malaria transmission, strongly affected by ecological conditions, 
directly affects the level of income per capita after controlling for the quality of institutions. Malaria risk is 
instrumented by an index of malaria ecology (based on temperature, species abundance, etc.), which predicts 
malaria risk well.    3   
 
rather than in growth in income per capita. The income-per-capita literature has a much 
richer tradition in allowing for endogeneity and instruments for institutions and trade 
openness. Our objective is to econometrically test whether there is robust evidence for a 
resource curse for income per capita, and to test whether such a curse if it exists is especially 
severe in countries with poor institutions and lack of openness to international trade.  
We find limited support for the hypothesis that resource endowments have a negative effect 
on income per capita, and find that this curse is more severe in countries with little trade 
openness. Once we allow for endogeneity of the explanatory variables in our income-per-
capita regressions, we find that empirical support for a curse of resources on income per 
capita is weak. Cross-country variations in economic growth are unlikely to be explained by 
resource stocks as natural resource stocks under the ground change very little over time 
(except in the rare case of large discoveries) compared to economic growth. This is why we 
offer resource curse results for income rather than growth in income per capita. 
 
Section 2 takes as starting point the literature that explains cross-country variations in income 
per capita in terms of institutions, openness, and geography. Adding natural resource exports 
as an additional explanatory variable, we find a significant negative effect of resource exports 
on income per capita. We also find evidence of interaction terms suggesting that the natural 
resource curse particularly harms income per capita in countries with bad institutions or bad 
policies. When we estimate with instrumental variables techniques (IV) rather than OLS, we 
find that the results do not stand up very well as the estimates are less precisely determined 
and support for the curse is much weaker. Section 3 replaces the traditional flow measure of 
resource dependence (i.e., share of exports of natural resources in GNI) by the World Bank’s 
recent stock estimates of natural capital (World Bank, 2006b). This allows one to study the 
effects of resource abundance rather than dependence. We find that resource abundance 
depresses income per capita, but less severely for countries that are de jure relatively open.
5 
Appendix B demonstrates the robustness of our income per capita regressions to alternative 
measures of institutional quality (namely, expropriation and corruption). Section 4 concludes. 
 
II.   INCOME PER CAPITA AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
The empirical evidence for the negative effect of natural resource exports on growth 
performance is mixed (Arezki and van der Ploeg, 2009). The OLS regressions suggest that 
growth is higher in countries that have good institutions, invest a lot, are open to international 
trade, and have a low initial level of income per capita. Furthermore, OLS estimates suggest 
that growth is lower in countries that are rich in natural resources, especially if they restrict 
international trade and the quality of institutions is poor. Unfortunately, these results do not 
                                                 
5 We also estimated using the ratio of natural capital over produced capital and the ratio of natural capital to 
total wealth. Our results are qualitatively similar when using those alternative measures.    4   
 
really stand up if institutional quality is instrumented by the logarithm of colonial settler 
mortality, legal origin, and the fraction of the population speaking English. Furthermore, the 
estimates suggest an implausibly slow speed of conditional convergence. To remedy this 
latter problem, it would help to estimate a dynamic panel. However, it is hard to identify 
valid instruments for endogenous variables that vary both across time and space. We 
therefore attempt to assess whether there is evidence that natural resources have additional 
explanatory power in addition to geography, openness, and institutional quality in explaining 
cross-country variations in the level rather than the growth of income per capita, using 
instruments available from the literature to address endogeneity issues.  
Figure 1 indicates that there are various direct and indirect ways by which resource 
dependence can make a country poorer. The first one (arrow 1) is that natural resources 
through government involvement in the resource sector provide an open invitation to 
rapacious rent seeking. Unleashing rent seeking behavior is likely to lead to unproductive 
government spending, largely benefiting political elites. The resulting voracity effect lowers 
income per capita. It is an important reason why natural resources should be an important 
explanatory variable in any explanation of income per capita.  
The second one (arrows 4 and 3) is that natural resources erode the quality of institutions 
(e.g., the rule of law) and via this channel lower income per capita. Indeed, political elites 
have no incentive to reinforce institutions such as the implementation of checks and balances 
and thus pave the way to “grabber friendly” institutions; talented individuals as a result 
engage in activities that are socially unproductive such as rent seeking (Mehlum, et al., 
2006). Hence, resource-rich countries perform poorly compared to resource-poor countries. 
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The third one (arrows 5 and 7) argues that the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the 
decline of the non-resource exposed sectors may induce a lobby for more restrictive trade 
policies (import substitution, subsidies for pet manufacturing companies, etc.) and in this 
way lower income per capita. Indeed, in countries that have adopted import substitution 
policies, entrepreneurs have little incentive to seek productivity gains. Also, import 
substitution has led to misallocation of factors in the form of the emergence of capital-
intensive industries despite capital scarcity in those countries. All these inefficiencies have in 
turn led to low economic performance in those countries. Empirical evidence suggests that 
country with policies tilted towards more open trade regimes are less distortive and achieve a 
higher level of income per capita (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995). One of the 
explanations put forward to explain such results is that adopting more outer-oriented trade 
regime prevents the government’s temptation to put in place counterproductive policies such as 
import substitution policies. Of course, just like geography, trade policies/trade openness and 
the quality of institutions also have a direct effect on income per capita (arrows 7 and 3). 
Most prominently, North (1990) highlighted the the role institutions play in shaping 
economic performance by enabling private investment to thrive. Rodrik, et al. (2004) provide 
more systematic evidence for the role of institutions. However, income per capita might also 
affect trade openness and institutional quality (arrows 6 and 2). Indeed, richer countries 
would also certainly be in a better position to trade with other countries through the more 
sophiscated products they have to offer and achieve a better quality of institution through the 
availability of resources to the public brought about by higher income. From a statistical 
standpoint, it is thus important to look for good instruments (including natural resource 
dependence) to correct for the endogenous nature of these explanatory variables.  
 
 
A.   OLS Estimates 
Before we do that, Table 1 presents OLS regressions that explain cross-country variations in 
income per capita in the year 2003 (i.e., lnGDP/cap03 in Appendix A). Regression (2) 
confirms the empirical results of a large number of empirical studies. Cross-country 
variations in income per capita are well explained by geography, institutions, and de facto 
openness. If a country is close to the equator, has limited rule of law, and is not much 
exposed to international trade, it is more likely to have low income per capita. In line with 
the horse race conducted by Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) we find that 
institutional quality is the most important explanation of income per capita. However, 
regression (3) indicates that, even once we control for geography, institutions, and openness, 
natural resource exports in 1970 have a strong additional negative impact on income per 
capita. This gives empirical support for a significant natural resource curse effect at the 5 
percent significance level. 
Regressions (4) and (5) suggest that there is no evidence of significant interaction terms of 
natural resources with rule of law or openness.
6 To avoid problems arising from collinearity 
                                                 
6 When the non-resource exports openness indicator is used, it leads to qualitatively similar results. However, 
the variance of the coefficient associated with the non-resource trade openness indicator is now smaller, 
(continued…)    6   
 
of openness and institutional quality, regressions (6) and (7) try them one at a time. 
Regression (6) indicates that there is no evidence for a significant interaction term of the rule 
of law with natural resource dependence. If we drop the rule of law as an explanatory 
variable, regression (7) suggests that there is still no evidence of a significant interaction term 
of openness with natural resource dependence. Our preferred regression of Table 1 is thus 
(3). If the Liberia and Zambia and had the same degree of resource dependence as Japan, 
they would suffer less from a resource curse.
7 In that case, regression (3) implies that their 
income per capita would, respectively, be 387 percent and 427 percent higher, everything 
else being equal. 
 
 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
disteq 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.027***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
rl01 0.906*** 0.581*** 0.652*** 0.711*** 0.576** 1.065***
[0.066] [0.087] [0.118] [0.216] [0.247] [0.190]
lnopen 0.413*** 0.417*** 0.427*** 0.716** 1.012***
[0.088] [0.107] [0.112] [0.283] [0.287]
lnsxpr -0.216*** -0.228** -0.088 -0.054 -0.187
[0.078] [0.087] [0.153] [0.076] [0.132]




Constant 8.253*** 8.686*** 8.402*** 8.398*** 8.778*** 8.272*** 8.524***
[0.110] [0.163] [0.207] [0.209] [0.400] [0.189] [0.397]
Observations 162 130 96 96 96 109 97
R-squared 0.679 0.734 0.774 0.774 0.777 0.747 0.701
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
B.   IV Estimates 
Rule of law and de facto openness suffer from endogeneity bias. Hence, we instrument rule 
of law with combinations of United Kingdom legal origin, log of settler mortality and 
fraction of population speaking English. We employ the colonial settler mortality data used 
by Acemoglu et al. (2001) as instrument for institutional quality. Colonial empires robbed 
states of their natural resources in which indigenous diseases were rife and survival prospects 
                                                                                                                                                         
reflecting the reduced colinearity with the natural resource indicator. Despite the variance associated with the 
interaction term between the corrected openness indicator and the natural resource indicator being smaller, it 
remains statistically insignificant. 
7 In the sample of 96 countries used in regression (5) in Table 1, Japan has the lowest share of exports of 
primary products in GNP in 1970.  
Table 1: OLS Regressions for Income Per Capita 2003 with Log of Natural Resource Exports    7   
 
were poor, and thus did not invest in good institutions. We separately use data on the fraction 
of the population speaking English or Western European languages as a first language used 
by Hall and Jones (1999) to instrument institutional quality. This has the advantage that it 
permits a much larger sample. We use an instrument based on a gravity model suggested by 
Frankel and Romer (1999) to instrument openness to international trade. 
The IV approach requires that the instruments be valid, but it is hard to come up with truly 
exogenous instruments that satisfy the exclusion restriction (i.e., that do not affect the 
dependent variable directly, but only through the explanatory variables they are being used to 
instrument). Since there are few potential instruments, one may end up with just-identified 
specifications so that only a limited number of issues can be resolved. For example, there 
may be problems in using the two instruments for institutions and openness simultaneously. 
The reason is that the predicted values of the explanatory variables are typically very 
collinear, so that inference is unreliable. Also, these instruments for institutions and openness 
are strongly correlated with geography/climate and human capital variables, so that it is 
unclear what is being identified and there is thus plenty of room for disagreement about 
interpretation. For example, on the basis of Sachs (2003) one may argue that settler mortality 
rates capture the historical impact of geography/climate rather than of institutional quality 
installed by colonial settlers. Alternatively, Glaeser and others (2004) argue that settler 
mortality captures the human capital of European settlers rather than institutional quality. 
Similarly, the gravity instruments for international trade may simply capture the effects of 
geography on income per capita. Finally, it is difficult to resolve the issue of reverse 
causality. An instrument that strongly predicts the determinants of income per capita but has 
no correlation with income per capita itself is hard to find.
8  
Explanatory variables that do not suffer from endogeneity bias are also included in the set of 
instruments. Hence, natural resource exports are also an instrument for openness and rule of 
law.
9 This is important for obtaining consistent estimates, since Figure 2 suggests that rule of 
law and the ratio of natural resource exports (or natural capital) to national income are highly 
negatively correlated. 
 
                                                 
8 Rigobon and Rodrick (2004) split their sample into two sub-samples (colonies versus non-colonies and 
continents aligned along an East-West axis versus those aligned on a North-South axis) and exploit the 
differences in structural variance in these sub-samples to identify parameters. They find that democracy and 
especially the rule of law boost income per capita, but openness negatively affects income per capita and 
democracy and positively affects the rule of law. 
9 During the colonial era, resource-rich countries have been encouraged to export cheap natural resources (the 
“plunder” effect) but were not encouraged to set up democratic institutions since democratization could weaken 
the ability of colonial powers to plunder those natural resources. Thus, openness can have a negative effect on 
per capita income both because of a direct “plunder” effect and indirectly by its effect on the quality of 
institutions.  
    8   
 
 
Table 2 presents the IV regressions for cross-country variations in income per capita in 2003 
(i.e., lnGDP/cap03). Although the core regression that explains cross-country variations in 
income by geography, institutions, and openness survives in the IV estimates, there appears 
to be a significant additional negative effect of natural resource exports in regressions (2) and 
(3) at the 5 percent level. However, rule of law is no longer statistically significant at the 
5 percent level, while openness is at least significant in regression (2) and distance to the 
equator is of the right sign albeit statistically insignificant. Also, when using more 
instruments than endogenous variables, the over-identification tests suggest that we cannot 
rely on regressions (2) or (3). Regression (1) suggests that cross-country variations in income 
are explained by distance to the equator and a resource curse. Regressions (4)-(6) indicate 
that there is no evidence for interactive effects of natural resource exports with de facto 
openness, but there is some evidence of interactive effect with institutional quality, despite 
the over-identification tests suggesting that over-identifying restrictions are not valid. 
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Logarithm Natural Resources exports in percent of GDP, 1965
Figure: Rule of Law and Natural Resource Exports as a share of GDP
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Logarithm of Natural Capital over GNI (year 2000)
Figure: Rule of Law and Natural Capital over GNI
Data source: see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002) & World Bank (2006)   9   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rl01 0.337 0.391 0.656** 0.980** 0.485 0.488
[0.367] [0.363] [0.267] [0.442] [0.306] [0.302]
interactrl01 0.177 0.235** 0.214*
[0.128] [0.107] [0.112]
lnopen 0.325 1.316*** 0.407 0.470 0.718** 0.528
[0.306] [0.440] [0.265] [0.515] [0.290] [0.387]
interactlnopen 0.096
[0.099]
disteq 0.024* 0.010 0.007 -0.016 0.001 0.003
[0.014] [0.015] [0.009] [0.018] [0.010] [0.011]
lnsxpr -0.187* -0.512** -0.213** -0.326 -0.406*** -0.331*
[0.100] [0.250] [0.093] [0.250] [0.142] [0.178]
Constant 8.003*** 8.990*** 8.393*** 8.936*** 8.702*** 8.731***




legor_uk, engfrac legor_uk, engfrac
logsetmort, 
legor_uk, engfrac legor_uk, engfrac
legor_uk, 
engfrac
lnopen lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex
Observations 96 63 96 58 89 89
R-squared 0.736 0.506 0.774 0.611 0.748 0.76
overid pvalue … 0.002 0.009 0.01 0.034 0.042
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables  
 
 
III.   NATURAL CAPITAL AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLE 
Our IV estimates indicate a negative effect of natural resource exports on income per capita. 
Here we use the estimates of natural capital for 2000 developed by the World Bank (2006b) 
to explain income per capita in 2003. Natural capital effectively corresponds to an estimate 
of the total stock of sub-soil assets, timber, non-timber forest resources, protected areas, 
cropland, and pastureland corrected for the renewable nature of resources when relevant. One 
might argue that natural capital over gross national income (GNI) better captures natural 
resource abundance than natural resource exports as a share of GNI, which may suffer from 
endogeneity bias. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that natural resource exports 
indicators often used in the resource curse literature capture resource dependence rather than 
resource abundance. A stock variable like natural capital may be more appropriate for 
explaining income per capita than a flow variable like natural resource exports, since it can 
capture forward-looking expectations of government and the private sector about future 
natural resource revenues. Indeed, if demand is iso-elastic and marginal extraction costs are 
zero, the Hotelling rule implies that resource prices grow at the market rate of interest and 
natural capital is then exactly equal to the discounted stream of resource revenues. More 
generally, one might expect natural capital to be closely related to the discounted value of 
natural resource rents. We thus wish to test the hypothesis that the discounted stream of all 
future resource rents proxied by natural capital rather than simply the current natural resource 
exports invites voracious rent seeking and thus harms income per capita. Using natural 
Table 2: IV Income Per Capita 2003 Regressions Using Log of Natural Resource Exports   10  
 




A.   OLS Regressions with De Facto Openness 
Table 3 first presents the results from the OLS regressions. Interestingly, the log of natural 
capital always has a negative impact on income per capita and is significant at the 5 percent 
level in all regressions except (5).
11 Regressions (1) and especially (2) are again the core 
regression results that confirm that institutions, openness, and geography determine cross-
country variations in income. Regression (3) indicates that the log of natural capital depresses 
income per capita even after allowing for the effects of distance to the equator, rule of law, 
and de facto openness. Regression (4) shows that there is no evidence of an interaction effect 
of natural capital with rule of law and regression (6) indicates that this is the case even if 
openness is dropped. This suggests that the disastrous consequences of rapacious rent 
seeking on growth are mainly elicited through natural resource export revenues rather than 
by how much oil, gas, or other resources are underground. However, regression (5) shows 
that the interaction term of natural capital with openness is significant at the 5 percent level. 
To avoid collinearity of rule of law and de facto openness, regression (7) drops the rule of 
law as an explanatory variable and now finds that at the 5 percent level natural capital has a 
significant negative effect and its interaction term with openness is now significant at 1 
percent. The results thus suggest that income per capita is high for countries that are far from 
the equator and relatively open. There is evidence for a resource curse in the sense that 
natural resource abundance harms income per capita. Furthermore, this resource curse is less 
severe for more open economies. However, even for the most open countries in our sample, 





                                                 
10 Stijns (2005) uses the reserves of oil, gas, coal, minerals, and land to test for the adverse effect of resource 
abundance on growth. He finds this is only the case for land, which correlates (in contrast to oil, gas, and 
minerals) with bad institutions and bad policies. He also stresses that the ability to turn the curse into a blessing 
depends on the nature of the learning process. Unfortunately, Stijns (2005) does not control for investment rates 
or the initial level of GDP per capita. 
11 This is in contrast to Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), who find a direct positive effect of resource 
abundance and an indirect negative effect of resource dependence (through worsening of institutional quality) 
on growth performance. It is also in contrast to earlier evidence using natural wealth date for a resource blessing 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
disteq 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.026***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
rl01 0.906*** 0.581*** 0.523*** 0.480*** 0.552*** 0.624***
[0.066] [0.087] [0.114] [0.118] [0.120] [0.115]
lnopen 0.413*** 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.101 0.291***
[0.088] [0.095] [0.095] [0.114] [0.102]
lnnatcapitalovergni -0.174** -0.198*** 0.019 -0.213*** -0.168**
[0.067] [0.069] [0.114] [0.071] [0.071]




Constant 8.253*** 8.686*** 8.701*** 8.768*** 8.603*** 8.492*** 8.671***
[0.110] [0.163] [0.173] [0.179] [0.189] [0.148] [0.162]
Observations 162 130 106 106 106 107 112
R-squared 0.679 0.734 0.755 0.759 0.772 0.728 0.714
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
rl01 0.098 0.241 1.566*** 1.123*** 1.365*** 1.293***
[0.594] [0.654] [0.543] [0.347] [0.332] [0.295]
lnopen -0.433 -0.364 0.245 -0.442
[0.550] [0.554] [0.382] [0.542]
interactrl01 0.044 -0.445 0.055 0.100
[0.141] [0.328] [0.134] [0.119]
interactlnopen 0.662* 0.077
[0.389] [0.164]
disteq 0.025* 0.027 -0.025 0.003 -0.019 -0.018 0.033***
[0.014] [0.018] [0.023] [0.009] [0.015] [0.014] [0.008]
lnnatcapitalovergni -0.413* -0.497 -0.081 0.910 -0.034 -0.041 -0.487
[0.236] [0.342] [0.141] [0.576] [0.136] [0.126] [0.328]
Constant 8.307*** 7.763*** 8.683*** 8.752*** 9.037*** 9.047*** 7.721***






engfrac logsetmort, engfrac …
lnopen … lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex … lnfrinstex
Observations 107 106 60 106 61 61 112
R-squared 0.656 0.548 0.387 0.513 0.502 0.514 0.503
overid pvalue … … 0.349 0.424 0.250 0.0885 …
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables  
 
B.   IV Regressions with De Facto Openness 
In order to make inferences about the causality of the relationship between natural capital and 
income per capita, Table 4 corrects for the endogeneity of de facto openness and institutional 
quality and presents the resulting IV estimates. Apart from regression (4), the log of natural 
Table 3: OLS Income Per Capita 2003 Regressions Using Log of Natural Capital 
Table 4: IV Income Per Capita Regressions 2003 Using Log of Natural Capital   12  
 
capital has a negative impact on income per capita. This individual impact is significant in 
regression (1). There is no evidence of an interaction effect of natural capital with 
institutional quality. Furthermore, the interaction effect of natural capital with de facto 
openness has the right sign in regressions (4) and (7). It is significant at the 10 percent level 
in regressions (4) and the over-identification test suggests that the overidentification 
restrictions are valid.  
C.   Natural Capital and De Jure Trade Openness 
To enable comparison with Sachs and Warner (1997), we check the robustness of our results 
when using de jure openness (number of years that a country is rated open to trade) rather 
than de facto openness (sum of exports and imports as fraction of GD) as explanatory 
variable. The advantage of this measure is that it is more exogenous. Table 5 presents the 
resulting OLS regressions. All regressions show evidence of a significant negative effect at 
the 1 percent level of the log of the ratio of natural capital to GNI on income per capita. 
Income per capita clearly rises with distance from the equator, the rule of law, and de jure 
openness, but regression (3) shows that there is in addition a strong and significant resource 
curse effect at the 5 percent level even after controlling for these standard explanations of 
income per capita. Regression (4) gives evidence at the 5 percent level for a significant 
interaction effect of natural capital with rule of law, which suggests that the resource curse is 
less severe for countries with good institutions. Both institutional quality and trade policy 
indicators may reflect the willingness of the government to adopt good policies toward 
domestic and foreign investors and trade partners. Indeed, to avoid issues of multi-
collinearity, regression (7) drops the rule of law and its interaction with natural capital. There 
is then evidence of a significant interaction term of natural capital with de jure openness. 
Hence, if a country abandons trade restrictions, the resource curse seems to be less severe.
12 
To correct for the possible endogenous character of de jure openness and rule of law, Table 6 
presents some IV regressions. There is almost always a negative individual effect of the log 
of the ratio of natural capital to national income, but it is only significant at the 10 percent 
level in regressions (1). Regressions in Table 6 indicate that there is no evidence of a 
significant interaction term of natural capital with institutional quality. Furthermore, in 
regressions (3)-(6) this term has the wrong sign. However, there is evidence of a significant 
interaction term of natural capital with de jure openness in regressions (3) and (4) where the 
interaction term is significant at the 10 percent level. The over-identification tests in 
regressions (3) and (4) also suggest that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Trade 
policies directed toward more exposure to foreign competition and transfer of technology and 
                                                 
12 Indeed regression (7) in Table 5 indicates that the resource curse is attenuated by a higher degree of de jure 
openness. However, according to that regression, the curse can not be turned into a blessing. 
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managerial skills can thus weaken the resource curse and even transform it into a blessing for 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
disteq 0.029*** 0.012** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.027***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
lnnatcapitalovergni -0.425*** -0.193*** -0.169** -0.199*** -0.312*** -0.213*** -0.474***
[0.053] [0.069] [0.074] [0.073] [0.110] [0.071] [0.094]
rl01 0.658*** 0.533*** 0.392*** 0.454*** 0.624***
[0.110] [0.128] [0.140] [0.147] [0.115]
open6590 0.375* 0.583** 0.414 0.730***
[0.220] [0.235] [0.265] [0.204]




Constant 8.208*** 8.439*** 8.219*** 8.256*** 8.332*** 8.492*** 8.109***
[0.138] [0.139] [0.177] [0.174] [0.182] [0.148] [0.179]
Observations 114 107 100 100 100 107 100
R-squared 0.621 0.725 0.755 0.767 0.771 0.728 0.735
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
rl01 0.098 0.694 3.148* 2.561 2.270 1.365***
[0.594] [0.763] [1.720] [2.486] [1.963] [0.332]
open6590 1.706 -2.598 -1.930 -1.013 2.402
[1.361] [2.675] [3.644] [3.452] [5.144]
interactrl01 0.286 -1.059 -0.988 -0.649 0.055
[0.197] [0.843] [0.875] [0.916] [0.134]
interactopen6590 2.793* 2.813* 2.214 2.762
[1.642] [1.635] [1.646] [3.353]
disteq 0.025* -0.003 -0.045 -0.029 -0.029 -0.019 0.027**
[0.014] [0.024] [0.042] [0.066] [0.045] [0.015] [0.013]
lnnatcapitalovergni -0.413* 0.083 -1.021 -1.101 -0.766 -0.034 -1.084
[0.236] [0.174] [0.637] [0.659] [0.708] [0.136] [0.873]
Constant 8.307*** 8.290*** 10.454*** 10.042*** 9.723*** 9.037*** 8.356***






engfrac logsetmort, legor_uk logsetmort, engfrac
logsetmort,  legor_uk, 
engfrac
lnopen lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex
Observations 107 57 57 57 57 61 100
R-squared 0.656 0.525 0.096 0.229 0.244 0.502 -0.372
overid pvalue … 0.390 0.877 0.502 0.542 0.250 …
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables  
 
 
                                                 
13 In fact, regressions (3) and (4) of Table 6 imply that the resource curse is turned into a blessing thanks to a 
high degree of de jure openness for the following countries: Australia, Bolivia, Barbados, Canada, Chile, 
Ecuador, Indonesia, Mauritius, Malaysia, and the United States.  
Table 5: OLS Income Per Capita Regressions with Natural Capital and De Jure Openness 
Table 6: IV Income Per Capita Regressions with Natural Capital and De Jure Openness   14  
 
IV.   CONCLUDING REMARKS  
We show that there is a direct negative effect of natural resources on income per capita. 
Support for such a curse is found regardless of whether we use resource abundance (natural 
resource stocks) or resource dependence (resource exports) as an explanatory variable. Given 
that natural capital is more exogenous than natural resource exports, there may be a casual 
negative relationship between resource abundance and economic performance. We also find 
strong evidence that de facto trade openness (the sum of exports and imports as fraction of 
GDP) attenuates this curse. We also find that the more exogenous measure of de jure 
openness (the number of years that a country is rated open to international trade) weakens 
this curse provided that institutional quality is removed as determinant of income per capita 
(which is likely to be collinear with trade policies). Those results offer a different perspective 
on the natural resource curse literature, which has hitherto focused on the effect of resources 
on growth in income per capita rather than on income per capita. 
In future work it is important to distinguish between point-source and diffuse natural 
resources. The former are typically associated with capital-intensive extraction and 
concentrated ownership while rents associated with the latter are more widely dispersed, 
hence point-source resources are more prone to rapacious rent seeking and lead to a more 
severe curse (Isham et al., 2005; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Lay and Mahmoud, 
2004; Bosschini et al., 2007). Building on cross-country evidence that volatility harms 
growth provided by Ramey and Ramey (1995), it is important to investigate whether and 
through which channels the notorious volatility of natural resource prices induces real 
exchange rate volatility and harms economic performance.  
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Appendix A: Data 
Category Variable  Mnemonic  Source 
log of real gross domestic product per capita 
(international $ in current prices) in 2003. 
lnGDP/cap03  Heston Summers and 
Aten PWT 6.2 (2006) 
Initial income 
fraction of years during 1965–90 in which 
country is rated open (de jure measure). 
open6590  Sachs and Warner (1997) 
Log of average (exports+imports)/GDP, 
measured in constant 1985 US dollars.  
lnopen  Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
Openness 
log of extended version of Frankel and 
Romer (1999) instrument (de facto measure). 
Lnfrinstex  Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
share of exports of primary products in GNP 
in 1970. 
 






natural logarithm of natural capital 2000, in 
thousand of US $ over GNI (in current US$ 
2000). 
lnnatcapitalovergni World  Bank  (2006)   
rule of law 2000/01.  rl01  Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002) 
log settler mortality.  logsetmort  La Porta et al. (2004) 
expropriation risk.  exprorisk  La Porta et al. (2004) 
corruption index (ICRG).  corrupt  La Porta et al. (1999) 
fraction of population speaking English.  engfrac  Hall and Jones (1999). 
Institutions 
legal origin—British.  legor_uk  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Geography  distance from equator, measured as absolute 
value of latitude of capital city. 
disteq  Sachs and Warner (1997) 
 
Appendix B: Robustness 
Tables 7 and 8 present the IV regressions that explain income per capita in terms of distance to the 
equator, de facto trade openness, and expropriation risk or corruption (both obtained from the 
International Country Risk Guide) as alternative measures of institutional quality to rule of law.
14 
Interestingly, the results also suggest a natural resource curse as there is a negative effect of the log of 
the ratio of natural capital over gross national income on income per capita even after controlling for 
the effects of geography and these alternative measures of institutional quality. However, this results 
is significant at the 5 percent level in regressions in Tables 7 and 8. However, Figure 3 displays a 
strong correlation between expropriation risk/corruption and natural capital. This suggests that natural 
resources have an adverse effect on income per capita through a worsening of institutional quality as 
illustrated by arrow 4 combined with arrow 3 in Figure 1. Furthermore, we find weak evidence of 
                                                 
14 Knack and Keefer (1995) also use a variety of alternative measures of institutional quality to empirically 
examine the relationship between institutions and growth using cross-country data.    18  
 
cross-country correlation between natural resource abundance and inflation.
15 One reason might be 
that averaging over a long period might smooth out the variation. Thus, further investigation of the 
empirical relationship between inflation and resource abundance using time series variation is needed. 
However, the high correlation (in absolute terms) between institutional quality and resource 
abundance suggests that resource abundance affects income per capita directly (affecting directly a 
nation's incentives to improve economic performance) and through damaging institutions and not 
necessarily through the so-called Dutch disease channel. Regressions Tables 7 and 8 again provide no 
evidence of an interaction effect of natural resources with expropriation risk or corruption. However, 
there is again evidence for an interaction effect of natural capital with openness in regression (4) in 






                                                 
15 The cross-correlations between inflation over the period 1970 to 1990 and the logarithm of natural resource 
exports over GNP in 1970 or the logarithm of natural capital over GNI in 2000 equal 6 percent and  9 percent, 
respectively. In future work we will investigate the empirical relationship between volatility in the real 
exchange rate and resource abundance. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
exprorisk 0.085 0.634*** 0.157 0.575*** 0.360*** 0.556*** 0.415***
[0.328] [0.174] [0.383] [0.160] [0.132] [0.176] [0.126]
interactexprorisk 0.088 0.037 0.055
[0.089] [0.081] [0.088]
lnopen -0.432 0.390 0.682* -0.487 -0.442
[0.567] [0.360] [0.380] [0.453] [0.542]
interactlnopen 0.722* 0.077
[0.396] [0.164]
disteq 0.025 0.003 0.026 0.009 0.017** 0.011 0.011 0.033***
[0.016] [0.010] [0.021] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
lnnatcapitalovergni -0.355** -0.203 -0.462 -0.177 -0.719 0.641 -0.618 -0.487
[0.172] [0.175] [0.307] [0.178] [0.519] [0.916] [0.517] [0.328]
Constant 7.712*** 4.337*** 6.672*** 5.145*** 6.859*** 4.055** 5.751*** 7.721***










engfrac logsetmort, legor_uk …
lnopen … lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex … lnfrinstex
Observations 90 52 89 51 51 51 52 112
R-squared 0.655 0.508 0.534 0.607 0.619 0.622 0.572 0.503
overid pvalue … 0.138 … 0.306 0.327 0.235 0.198 …
Robust standard errors in bracket
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: IV Income Per Capita Regressions Using Expropriation Risk Index    19  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
corrupt 0.088 0.153 0.433*** 0.411 0.458**
[0.320] [0.336] [0.134] [0.305] [0.191]
lnopen -0.361 -1.940 0.326 -0.442
[0.567] [1.825] [0.391] [0.542]
interactcorrupt 0.183 -0.126 0.256
[0.212] [0.221] [0.274]
interactlnopen 1.578 0.677** 0.077
[1.657] [0.319] [0.164]
disteq 0.021 0.021 0.002 0.007 -0.006 0.033***
[0.024] [0.028] [0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.008]
lnnatcapitalovergni -0.375** -0.470 1.078 1.541 -1.501 -0.487
[0.153] [0.292] [2.397] [1.774] [1.319] [0.328]
Constant 7.915*** 7.161*** 3.977 6.741*** 6.567*** 7.721***







lnopen … lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex lnfrinstex
Observations 89 88 51 88 52 112
R-squared 0.649 0.552 -0.216 0.477 -0.652 0.503
overid pvalue … … 0.564 0.333 0.289 …
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1/ Interactive variables are instrumented using lnsxpr time the instruments used for the individual variables  
 
 

















































































































-4 -2 0 2 4
Logarithm Natural Capital over GNI (year 2000)
Figure: Expropriation Risk and Natural Capital over GNI
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Figure: Corruption and Natural Capital over GNI 
Data source: see La Porta et al. (1997) & Sachs and Warner (1997)
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